T he international relations theory of G. Lowes Dickinson has long puzzled both critics and admirers alike because of what appears to be its complicated amalgam of "idealist" and "realist" sensibilities. For decades, International Relations (IR) scholars have attempted to identify Dickinson as one or the other. Thus, for E. H. Carr, Dickinson represented all that was most willfully ignorant about those League of Nations reformers he associated with the "utopian edifice."
1 Other realists such as Kenneth Waltz, by contrast, embraced Dickinson as a fellow realist and sympathetically tut-tutted the manner in which Dickinson was "blasted by liberals and socialists alike for reversing the dominant inside-out explanation," that is, the idea that the behavior of states is best understood by looking at their form rather than at the power arrangements of international politics.
2 More recently, Mearsheimer, has resuscitated Dickinson's work as an embryonic form of "offensive realism."
3 Scholars of the history of international thought, while taking a slightly more nuanced approach to Dickinson, continue to locate his notion of "international anarchy" along some point on the idealist/realist continuum. David Long, for instance, argues that Dickinson's understanding of the current system of armed states best resembles an unalloyed form of "Hobbesian idealism."
4 Andreas Osiander, however, argues that aside from the "overtones of moralism and voluntarism" implicit in Dickinson's analysis, there is little there that characterizes it as "IR Idealist if that label is to denote a specific type of IR theory." 5 Dickinson might have used "idealist" sounding terms, Osiander maintains, but his overall approach simply reflected "the strong presence of Realist ideas" on international discourse at the time. Brian Schmidt is likewise interested in emphasizing what he understands to be the largely realist impulses of Dickinson's work on international relations, impulses that he maintains were entirely distinct from Dickinson's earlier writings on "morals and religion."
6 For Schmidt, Dickinson, the Cambridge don and classics scholar, "completely changed intellectual directions" when he embraced the study of international relations during the war, ostensibly leaving his earlier engagement with philosophical idealism behind.
I argue in this chapter, however, that the IR terms realist and idealist developed by Carr and others during the First Debate of the interwar period simply do not adequately describe the contours of Dickinson's approach, an approach developed before that bifurcating rhetoric so central to the emerging discipline had taken hold. Thus, rather than reading Dickinson as more or less of a IR realist and rather than thinking about his work in terms of a clean break between his early philosophical idealism and his international relations scholarship, I maintain that we need to understand his notion of international anarchy as continually informed by all of the sensibilities of both his earlier and later works on classics and idealist philosophy. Dickinson's work was "idealist" in the philosophical sense but also complicated by a particular reading of human nature that rendered it deeply and critically observant of international power politics, so much so that it often took on the sheen of a Mearsheimer-like, systems-oriented view of state relations. I argue that Dickinson's critical understanding of "the ideal" as "the never satisfied" compelled him toward a critique of precisely the false dichotomy between "brutal realism and a blind idealism" into which scholars try to force his work to this day. Dickinson's approach, I suggest, continues to be instructive for anyone wishing to challenge that polarized and parochial vision of much contemporary IR scholarship.
The chapter begins by first examining the connection between Dickinson's idealism and his understanding of human beings as makers or crafters of the ideal. I then explore how this approach influenced Dickinson's complex thought on the relationship between human nature, sovereignty, and history. I argue that this approach enabled him to interrogate the self-reinforcing logic of realist attacks on the movement for international peace by questioning their historical assumptions. Finally, I offer a few thoughts on Dickinson's somewhat embattled legacy and the way his humanist, critical idealism continues to offer a fascinating analytical challenge to the rhetorical move that declares war a "necessity of nature," a "fate to which men must passively bow."
7 By looking to the past not to justify
